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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH ADOPTION SERVICES FOR
WOMEN, a Utah non-profit
corporation,

BRIEF
OF UTAH ADOPTION
SERVICES FOR WOMEN

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

Case No. 89-0018-CA

BRADLEY THOMAS BELANGER

(Trial Court
Civil No. C88-03292)

Defendant/Appellant

THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, Utah Adoption Services For
Women, by and through counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard of
the Utah Legal Clinic, submits the following BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT and CROSS APPELLANT and seeks the affirmance of
the decision of the trial court, the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. Leonard H.
Russon, judge presiding.
The plaintiff also seeks reversal of the trial court's
decision to deny court costs to the prevailing party, the
plaintiff.

i

I
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this case pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 75-2a-3 (2)(g) (1953 as amended) and Rule
4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals•

II
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The trial court correctly applied Utah law to the
instant case.
The trial court correctly found that the defendant was
required to and failed to satisfy the legal requirements of
establishing paternity in Utah.
The trial court correctly found that the defendant
failed to satisfy the legal requirements of establishing
paternity in Nevada.
The trial court did not deprive defendant of rights
without due process in terminating his parental rights after
he failed to provide the proper notice of paternity as
required by Utah law.
The trial court correctly found that the Interstate
Compact on placement of children was not applicable to this
matter and that plaintiff did not violate said compact.

9

The trial court erred in declining to tax costs against
defendant and in not providing any reasons for this
decision.

Ill
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff adoption agency sought a declaratory
judgment that temporary custody of the child born to "D.R.F"
and defendant was properly in the plaintiff, and sought an
order allowing the adoption of the child to proceed.

The

trial court granted to plaintiff the relief sought but
failed to tax costs to the prevailing party.

IV
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court applied Utah law to determine the
validity of the consents to the adoption and the adoption
itself.

The trial court found the consent of the natural

father invalid under Utah law, but determined that the
father relinquished any rights to the child when he failed
to register with the Utah Department of Vital Statistics.
The court imposed the Utah requirement on this
non-resident because in this case:

(1) the father knew that

the baby would be put up for adoption in Utah at least two
(2) months prior to the birth of the baby; (2) the father

had access to legal counsel if he wanted to protect his
rights to the child by objecting to the adoption prior to
its occurrence; and, (3) the father failed to establish
paternity even in his home state of Nevada prior to the
adoption.
Because defendant failed to act to protect his rights
to the child until well after the baby was born and placed
for adoption, the court terminated the limited rights of the
natural father.
Although the lower court found the consent signed by
defendant in Nevada was invalid, the consent and its signing
are useful in ascertaining the natural father's true intent
as to his alleged "disapproval11 of the adoption proceedings.
The lower court also found that the Interstate Compact
on Placement of Children did not have application in this
case, and also rejected defendant's claim for damages as a
result of alleged unprofessional or unethical conduct by
plaintiff.
The trial court denied plaintiff's court costs without
reason.

V
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The decision of the trial court finding a termination
of the parental rights of the defendant should be affirmed.

The decision of the trial court refusing, without
explanation, to award court costs to the plaintiff should be
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for the costs incurred,

VI
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Consent to adoption -- Paternity Claims
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1953 as amended)

Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4-301 et. seq. (1953 as amended)

Award of Court Costs
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

VII
STATEMENT OF CASE

The defendant executed a consent in Nevada giving up
all legal rights to a child born in Nevada to "D.R.F." and
immediately thereafter, the child was delivered to Utah and
placed with the plaintiff adoption agency by ffD.R.F.ff
Several days later, the defendant demanded possession of the
child and this action was commenced by the adoption agency

to determine the validity of the consent from the defendant,
to secure custody of the child, to terminate defendant's
parental rights and to allow the plaintiff agency to proceed
with the adoption of the child.
The defendant countersued for damages alleging improper
and unethical conduct on the part of the plaintiff agency,
and seeking delivery of the child to him.
After an expedited bench trial, the counterclaim was
dismissed as no cause of action, and the court determined on
the complaint that the defendant's parental rights had been
terminated by his failure to comply with the Utah child
acknowledgement statutes, although his consent signed in
Nevada did not comply with Utah law or Nevada law.

The

trial court's decision authorized the plaintiff to move
forward with the adoption proceeding.
The defendant appeals the decision terminating his
parental rights and allowing the adoption to move ahead.
The plaintiff cross-appeals the denial of an award of court
costs by the court.

During the pendency of the appeal, the

adoption proceeding has been stayed and the child remains in
the adoptive home in Utah.

fi

VIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant does not contest the Findings of Fact
made by the Trial Court, but makes a couple weak
suggestions that the certain Findings were wrong.

A review

of Findings by this Court on appeal requires a marshalling
of the evidence, and any alteration of Findings by this
Court would require a showing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the Findings and thus, that the
Findings were clearly erroneous.

Cornish Town v. Roller,

758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744
P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987).

The defendant has not begun to

meet his burden, and the Findings of Fact of the trial court
must stand.

The following facts are taken from the Findings of Fact
entered by the court after trial; the citations are to the
same numbered paragraphs of those findings.
1.

Defendant Belanger is the father of a male child

born on April 25, 1988 in Nevada.
2.

"D.R.F.", the mother of the child, is not a party

to this action.

She relinquished all rights to her minor

child and released the child to the plaintiff, Utah Adoption
Service for Women.

The child subsequently has been placed

in an adoptive home in Utah.

3.

The defendant claims his rights to the child.

7.

Defendant and D.R.F. lived together in Nevada from

May to September 1987 during which time D.R.F. conceived a
child by defendant.

They were never married.

In late

September, D.R.F. moved and no longer resided with the
defendant.

She and her sister moved to Salt Lake City, Utah

to live.
8.

D.R.F. told defendant of her pregnancy by phone

during the first week of October, 1987, and indicated that
she was considering placing the child for adoption in Utah.
When D.R.F. told defendant about the pregnancy and the
adoption plan, she understood he was not happy with her
decision but she felt he agreed to go along with it.
9.

In October 1987, while living with her sister in

Utah, D.R.F. contacted plaintiff, to discuss the adoption of
the expected child.
11.

From October 1987 to January 1988, D.R.F. and

defendant had numerous discussions concerning placing the
child for adoption.
favor of doing so.

Defendant indicated that he was not in
D.R.F. consistently said that she was

leaning towards placing the child for adoption and defendant
was saying he didn't want to place the child.
12.

In March, 1988 D.R.F. telephoned defendant to

again inform him of her plan for placing the child for
adoption in Utah, and asking him to meet her and a

representative of the plaintiff adoption agency, Dr. Sandra
Bagley, to discuss possible adoptive families and
defendant's medical history.

Defendant agreed to be

present. In attending that meeting, defendant said that he
would support D.R.F. emotionally, in the hopes that she
would change her mind and not place the child for adoption.
13.

On April 9, 1988, a meeting took place in Ontario,

California.

D.R.F., defendant and Dr. Bagley were present.

Defendant's medical history was discussed, as well as
potential adoptive families.

Defendant, at D.R.F.'s

request, took notes on the various families.

Defendant and

D.R.F. both participated in the discussion about families.
Bagley talked to defendant concerning a consent form
regarding the adoption that would eventually have to be
signed, and they reviewed it in part.

At some time during

the review of the form, defendant said, "I don't want to put
the child up for adoption."

Dr. Bagley considered this not

unusual since most natural parents do not want to place
their children for adoption.
reaction.

She considered this a natural

Defendant never said that he refused to place the

child for adoption.

Bagley explained the adoption procedure

to defendant during that meeting and told him that Utah law
would apply to the adoption.
form with defendant.

Dr. Bagley left the consent

He was not asked to sign papers at

that time, since the child was not yet born.

Bagley left

with him a business card and he understood that if he had
questions he could get in touch with her.
14.

D.R.F. planned to give birth to her child in the

state of Utah, and to then place the child with the plaintiff agency.

She wanted the baby to be born in Utah instead

of California, where she was then residing, so she would not
have to hand-deliver the baby to Utah.
15.

Defendant knew that D.R.F. was planning to place

her child for adoption with the plaintiff adoption agency in
Utah, and he knew that D.R.F. was planning to deliver the
baby at a hospital in Utah, and he had discussed the possibility of his being present in Utah during the birth of
the baby with Sandra Bagley.
16.

As the expected delivery date drew near, flight

arrangements were made by the plaintiff for D.R.F. to fly to
Utah for the purpose of delivering and relinquishing the
baby for adoption.

She left Ontario, California, on April

20, 1988 to go to Utah and stopped in Nevada to visit her
family for a few days.

While in Las Vegas, she entered into

premature labor and delivered the baby on April 25, 1988.
18.

Defendant visited D.R.F. in the hospital. Again,

adoption was discussed.

D.R.F. and defendant agreed between

them that defendant would later sign the consent giving the
child for adoption, if D.R.F. would then have his name
placed on the birth certificate.
10

19.

Upon release from the hospital on'April 26, 1988,

D.R.F., with her new infant, checked into a local motel
along with the Defendant.

During that evening, with

defendant present, Dr. Bagley called D.R.F. on the phone to
discuss travel arrangements.

She was told by D.R.F. that

defendant's name was on the birth certificate.

Bagley

informed D.R.F. that defendant then needed to sign the
consent form she had left with him.
found.

The forms could not be

Because D.R.F. was to fly out the next morning for

Salt Lake City, Utah, Bagley dictated by phone to D.R.F. a
consent to be signed by defendant.

As dictated D.R.F. wrote

the consent on the back of an envelope, and thereafter
rewrote it on a sheet of paper in her own hand.

Defendant

knew at this time that D.R.F. was going to fly the next
morning to Utah, with the baby, and was going to place the
child for adoption with the plaintiff agency in Utah.
20.

For unknown reasons, defendantfs name was not

placed on the birth certificate.
21.

The following morning, April 27, 1988, D.R.F.fs

mother arrived at the motel, along with D.R.F.fs sisterfs
boyfriend, a notary public, Dennis Brough.

D.R.F. told

defendant he had to sign the consent since he had agreed to
if his name was placed on the birth certificate, and he had
to do so quickly so she could make her flight to Utah.

The

notary public said nothing to him, nor did the notary place

him under oath or require him to acknowledge his signature.
Defendant read the consent, and in front of the notary
signed the same, and dated it.

Defendant had no questions

about it or about what it said when he signed it.

The

notary then notarized the consent, and left it with D.R.F.
The consent form was signed on April 27, 1988, and notarized
that date, although defendant had misdated it April 28,
1988.
22.

The consent form signed by defendant reads in

pertinent part as follows:
I, Bradley Thomas Belanger, release and
waive my parental rights to the male child
born on the 25th day of April, 1988, to the
natural mother [D.R.F.] at . . . Nevada. I
give my consent for this child to be placed
in the adoptive home selected by his natural
mother.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 28th
[sic] day of April, 1988.
The form was signed by Dennis R. Brough as a notary, and he
affixed his notary seal.

Later on that day, April 27th,

D.R.F. delivered the consent to Dr. Bagley in Utah.
23.

D.R.F. signed a valid Release of Custody and

Consent to Adoption on April 27, 1988 in Utah.

24.

The evening of April 27, 1988, defendant in a

telephone conversation with D.R.F. she confirmed that she
had executed the Release and placed the child for adoption.
Defendant said he was going to resist the adoption.
25.

Several days later, defendant was contacted by the

welfare department of Clark County, Nevada, who informed him
that they had received additional consent forms from the
plaintiff that required his signature.

He went to the

welfare department and informed them of his feelings and was
advised to obtain a lawyer.

He subsequently went to his

lawyer who had represent him in other matters over an
extended period of time.
26.

Defendant was informed on Tuesday, May 3, 1988 by

his lawyer that Nevada law required him to file an affidavit
at the hospital to be on the birth certificate, and if not,
to file an affidavit with the Nevada Department of Vital
Statistics acknowledging paternity of the child.

He filed

an affidavit with the State more than a week after the birth
and two months later he received a birth certificate with
his name on it.
27.

The child was placed in an adoptive home in Utah

on April 27, 1988, and still resides there awaiting
finalization of the adoption.

i
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28.

The plaintiff is a non-profit Utah corporation and

Utah licensed adoption agency, and Dr. Sandra Bagley is its
director.

IX
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I
The trial court properly found that Utah law applied in
the instant case.

The child was given up for adoption in

Utah and the adoption will take place in Utah.

The child

and adoptive parents currently reside in Utah.
Although Nevada law does not apply, it would not make
any difference to defendant if it did.
do not conflict.

The two state's laws

Both would result in terminating

defendant's parental rights.
Point II
The trial court correctly found that defendant failed
to comply with Utah law and Nevada law.
Defendant needed to comply with Utah law to assert his
parental rights.

He failed to do so.

Defendant also failed

to comply with Nevada law before the adoption took place.
The trial court did not err, then, in terminating
defendant's parental rights.

1U

Point III
The trial court, in applying the parental right
termination statute, did not deprive defendant of a right
without due process because defendant does not fit the
impossibility exception to the Utah statute.
Point V
The trial court correctly found the Interstate Compact
on Placement of Children did not apply because the mother
delivered the baby over in Utah.
Point V
The trial court abused its discretion in not taxing
costs against defendant.
Point VI
The trial court was arbitrary in not providing any
reasons for its decision not to tax costs.

i *

X
ARGUMENT

PART ONE

I. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED UTAH LAW TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
The trial court in its memorandum decision found, and
the defendant does not dispute that:

The infant in question

is the subject of a Petition for Adoption filed in the state
of Utah.

The petitioners in the adoption proceeding are

residents of the state of Utah, the baby was relinquished by
the natural mother in Utah to a licensed adoption agency,
and the child is presently in the home of the adoptive
parents in Utah awaiting further action on the petition.

A

consent of the natural father was made in the state of
Nevada, and hand-delivered by the natural mother to the
adoption agency in Utah along with the child.

Whether the

adoption is valid and whether the termination of the
defendant's rights is valid must be determined by Utah law.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971)
states:
A state
tion to
(a) it
adopted

has power to exercise judicial jurisdicgrant an adoption if:
is the state of domicile of either the
child or the adoptive parent, and

(b) the adoptive parent and either the adopted
child or the person having legal custody of the
child are subject to its personal jurisdiction.
In addition, Comment (d) of § 78 of the Restatement
states:

"In determining whether an adoption should be

granted, courts in this country apply their own local law
and not the law of some other state." Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 289 (1971); Scoles and Hay, Conflict
of Laws 541-42 (West Pub. 1982).
Although the trial court found that the Interstate
Compact on Placement of Children did not apply, the
provisions of that statute do provide some guidance.
Section 62A-4-301 of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
provides in subsection (1) of Article III that when a child
is brought form one state into another for the purpose of
adoption, "the applicable laws of the receiving state"
govern the agency's action.
Similarly, Scoles, Conflict of Laws notes the
appropriate locale for adoption proceedings is where the
child is domiciled.
Adoption at the domicile of the child, through
voluntary acts of the adopting parents performed there,
has been held valid both in the state of adoption and
elsewhere, even where the adoptive parents had no
domicile within the state. Decisions denying jurisdiction to adopt upon these facts seem to be based upon
interpretation of a particular statute, rather than
upon any general principle of jurisdiction.
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
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In In re Adoption of Baby Boy C., 644 P.2d 150, 153
(Wash. App. 1982) the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's determination that it had jxiris diet ion over an
adoption proceeding "because the adoptive parents [were]
domicilliaries of Washington."

In reaching its decision,

the court cited Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 78,
and noted that

ff

[t]he Restatement position has been increas-

ingly accepted by other jurisdictions.11

Id. at 153 (cita-

tions omitted) .
In Matter of Appeal in Pima Cty., Etc., 575 P.2d 310
(Ariz. 1978) the Arizona Supreme Court held that it had
jurisdiction to conduct adoption proceedings in the case of
three children brought from Texas.

Pursuant to Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 8-102, which grants Arizona
courts jurisdiction in adoption proceedings when a child is
present within that state, the court held that it could
properly exercise jurisdiction where the children were
brought from Texas with their natural mother's consent, and
with the approval of Texas authorities.

Id. at 314.

The proper choice of law, the defendant contends, is
Nevada.

Defendant relies on Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d

118 (Utah 1947) to support this contention.

In Buhler, the

Utah Supreme Court held that Nevada law applies to matters
of substantive law and the court will use Nevada law in
deciding what is substantive and procedural when a Utah

worker is injured in Nevada.

However, this action is not a

workmen's compensation case and the injury (or cause of
action) did not arise in a sister state (Nevada).
mother placed the child for adoption in Utah.

The

The adoption

will occur in Utah.

The defendant, then, needed to assert

his rights in Utah.

The failure to assert those rights, or

the cause of this action, arose in Utah.

Defendant cannot

assert his parental rights by filing a notice of paternity
in Nevada after the adoption has occurred in Utah.

(This

requirement may be unfairly applied to a defendant, see
infra part 111, but does not change which law to apply.)
Defendant may be correct in noting that certain "parental rights" arose in Nevada (Appellant's Brief, p. 27)
simply because of the birth of the child, but these
"parental rights" were not entitled to constitutional
protection until the defendant took some substantial step
toward securing that right.

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375

(Utah 1982); see also Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1977); Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(a) (1953 as amended)
(where father must file with registrar of vital statistics
and be willing to support the child).

"Although parental

rights have their origin in biological relationships, those
relationships do not guarantee the permanency of parental
rights."

Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d

199, 202 (Utah 1984).

"[T]he mere existence of a biological

link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."
Id. at 203 (1984); citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
Defendant's parental right did not arise to a legally
cognizable level until he took some affirmative step to
establish that right.

Signing a consent form to an

adoption, letting the mother give the child up for adoption
in Utah and not filing a claim of paternity with the Utah
Bureau of Vital Statistics (or indeed taking any action for
over six (6) days) does not evince a father who has
"fulfilled a parental role" but one whose relationship to
his child is "very attenuated" at best.

Wells at 203.

In any event, defendants parental right is not the
cause of this action.

It is the termination of those

rights, which occurred in Utah, which is the cause of this
action.

If this case dealt with denial of a paternity

acknowledgement, which defendant did receive, then Nevada
law would be controlling.

This action is concerned, howev-

er, with the validity of an adoption proceeding.

The

proceeding occurred in Utah and therefore Utah law applies.
While there is no case law directly on point, in light
of the foregoing provisions and cases, Utah law was properly
applied in the instant case.
Defendant herein alleges that there is a conflict
between Utah and Nevada law, and that Nevada law should
?n

govern.

Assuming, arguendo, that Nevada law does apply,

based on the facts of this case and the applicable Nevada
law, the result would be the same. Defendant failed to
comply with either state's laws before the adoption
occurred.

He would not be entitled to the relief he

requests under either state's law.

II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT DID NOT
COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW, AND ALTERNATIVELY, DID NOT COMPLY WITH

NEVADA LAW IN ESTABLISHING PATERNITY AM) OBJECTING TO THE
ADOPTION.
Since Utah law governs, the Utah statutes regarding
adoptions must be followed for adoptions to occur.

The

trial court did not err in finding that the adoption could
proceed and that any and all rights of the natural parents
were terminated.

Defendant never registered with the Utah

Registrar of Vital Statistics.
A person who is the father or claims to be the father
of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his
child by filing with the registrar of vital statistics in
the department of health, a notice of his claim of paternity
of an illegitimate child and of his willingness and intent
to support the child to the best of his ability.
Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(a) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code

Defendant clearly did not comply with these terms.
Defendant had sufficient opportunity to do so and has not
yet done so.

The trial court, then, was correct in finding

that defendant did not comply with Utah law.
Additionally, the trial court was correct in finding
that defendant did not comply with the requirements of
establishing paternity in Nevada.
[A man] may establish his paternity where (1) he and
the mother have been married during a certain period,
or (2) the father and the natural mother were co-habiting for at least six (6) months before the period of
conception and continued to co-habit through the period
of conception, or, (3) he receives the child into his
own home and openly holds it out as his natural child,
or (4) he and the mother attempted to marry before the
birth, or (5) at any time he acknowledges or admits his
paternity of the child in a writing filed with the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.041-051.
Defendant did not satisfy any of these requirements prior to
the time the child was placed for adoption.
Defendant is correct in noting that the Nevada statute
literally allows paternity to be established "at any time,11
yet this only applies to establishing paternity.

To be

applied to prevent an adoption proceeding, the defendant
must establish paternity before the baby is placed for
adoption.

The defendant's interpretation of "at any time"

would mean that he could acknowledge the child as his a year
or two after its birth and that he could then set aside or

reopen an adoption that occurred shortly after the birth;
this is not a reasonable interpretation and could not be
what the Nevada Legislature had in mind when it enacted the
statute.
Because the defendant did not satisfy the Nevada
statute by acknowledging or admitting paternity prior to the
adoption, (or under any other Nevada provision) and because
defendant did not even attempt to meet the requirements of
the Utah statute, the trial court was correct in finding
defendant had relinquished any and all rights to the child.
If a parent is truly interested in securing the rights of
his or her illegitimate child, the law gives such an interested parent adequate opportunity to do so.

Based on the

facts of this case, the "interested11 parent had more than
ample opportunity to assert his rights.

He failed to do so

and his parental rights were accordingly terminated.

III. THE COURT DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN
EXTINGUISHING HIS PARENTAL RIGHTST
To protect the limited constitutional rights of fathers
of illegitimate children in adoption proceedings (as
required by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983)), the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code
Annotated § 78-30-4 (1953 as amended).

This

statute has endured consistent equal protection and due
process constitutional attack.

Wells v. Children's Aid Soc.

of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social
Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social
Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988).

It has endured

because it is a fair balancing of the interests of the state
in securing quick and efficient placement of adopted
children and the limited rights of fathers of illegitimate
children to object to the proceedings.

Ellis v. Social

Services Dept., Etc. 615 P.2d 1250, 1255; Wells at 202-203,
207; Swayne at 937-42.

ff

The state must . . . have legal

means to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents
must be substituted."

Wells, at 203.

Although, Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4 (1953 as
amended) is constitutional on its face, it may not be
constitutional when applied.

Ellis at 1256.

Particular

circumstances may arise where the statute might unfairly
deny the parent's rights.

The filing requirement with the

Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics may not be appropriate in
some circumstances.

In such cases, the statute unconsti-

tutionally is applied to a particular parent and the
adoption cannot continue without some hearing to resolve the

parent's interest.

See Ellis at 1256; In Re Adoption of

Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).
Defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.

Specifically, defendant

contends that this statute should not require an out of
state parent to register with the Bureau of Vital Statistics.

The Utah Supreme Court, in recognizing that some

circumstances do not require registration with the Utah
Bureau prior to the adoption, carved out an exception in
individual cases.

This exception, known as the "impossibil-

ity" exception, applies "when it is impossible for the
father to file the required notice for paternity prior to
the statutory bar, through no fault of his own."

Ellis at

1256.
The Utah courts in determining whether the statute is
constitutionally applied, look at particular circumstances
of each parent and stress that general rules should not be
taken from these individual holdings.

Sanchez at 755 n.l.

However, basic "themes11 run throughout these cases.

These

are:
(1) whether the affected parent knew that an adoption
was about to take place.
1256.

See Baby Boy Doe at 690; Ellis at

(2) whether the affected parent knew when and where
the adoption was going to take place; Ellis at 1256 n. 16;
Baby Boy Doe at 691,
(3) whether the affected parent had a reasonable
amount of time to file to avoid the statutory bar; Baby Boy
Doe at 691; Sanchez at 755 (where one day was adequate
amount of time); Wells at 207.
In the instant case, defendant knew that an adoption
was about to take place.

Although defendant alleges he

really did not know the adoption would take place until it
happened and that he was always trying to dissuade the
mother, this is not truel

The mother and defendant father

met with the adoption agency in April, 1988, the mother
consistently maintained that the baby was going to be put up
for adoption, she told the defendant prior to the adoption
that she was going to Utah to give the child up.

In light

of these facts, defendant's contentions were found untrue by
the trial court.
This court should not adopt defendant's position in
this case.

It would be difficult for any biological father

to receive any greater notice of the adoption than defendant
received.

Defendant's position creates a special notice

requirement to the individual parent, which the Utah Supreme
Court has previously rejected (Wells at 208) , and creates a
great cloud of uncertainty over adoption proceedings.

Defendant does not dispute that he knew when and where
and with what agency the child would be placed for adoption.
The trial court specifically found that he knew that
information!

The specific and unchallenged Findings of Fact

recite:
13. On April 9, 1987 [sic - 1988], a meeting took
place in a restaurant in Ontario, California. D.R.F.,
Belanger and Dr. Bagley were present. . . . Bagley
explained the adoption procedure to Belanger during
that meeting and [she] told him that Utah law would
apply to the adoption. . . .
k

k

*k

15. Beginning in October 1987, Belanger knew that
D.R.F. was planning to place her child for adoption
with the plaintiff adoption agency in Utah, and he knew
that D.R.F. was planning to deliver the baby at a
hospital in Utah, and he had discussed with Sandra
Bagley the possibility of his being present in Utah
during the birth of the baby.
16. From the April 9, 1988 meeting until the birth of
the child, Belanger and D.R.F. communicated about twice
a week. During those conversations D.R.F. continued to
say that she was included to place the child for
adoption in Utah. . . .
17. After the birth of the child, while D.R.F. was in
the hospital, Belanger visited her. Again, adoption
was discussed. About noon on April 25 when [sic]
D.R.F. told Belanger that she felt obligated to go
through with her earlier decision to place the child
for adoption through the plaintiff. . . .
k

k

k

19. . . . Belanger knew at this time [evening of April
26, 1988] that D.R.F. was going to fly the next morning
to Utah, with the baby, and was going to place the
child for adoption with the plaintiff agency in Utah.
k

k

k
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29. Under the facts of this case, with the clear
knowledge of Belanger that the child was to be born in
Utah, to be placed for adoption with the plaintiff in
Utah, the defendant literally had months in which to so
register with the Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics since
such registration may occur prior to the birth of a
child in Utah. And, during this time, plaintiff [sic defendant] had legal counsel in other matters and could
have and should have protected his rights because of
the notice and knowledge that he had in this matter.
Belanger did not exercise his rights in the state of
Nevada for the establishment of his paternity as
required by Nevada statutes. . . . and he did not
timely acknowledged [sic] or admitted [sic] his
paternity in writing filed with the Nevada State
Registrar of Vital Statistics as required.
Defendant had adequate time to file with the Utah
Bureau.

Defendant knew beginning in October, 1987 that the

child would be placed up for adoption, and knew beginning in
January, 1988 that the child would be place in Utah through
the plaintiff agency.
Defendant, in claiming he did not have time to comply
with the statxite, asks the court to impose an unreasonable
time allowance/burden on adoption proceedings for fathers of
illegitimate children to assert their rights.
Finally, defendant argues that the statutory requirement unfairly applies to him because he did not know of the
Utah requirement as a Nevada resident.

Defendant uses Ellis

and In Re Baby Boy Doe to support his position.

In these

cases, the court found a denial of procedural due process
and an exception to the requirement of Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-30-4 (1953 as amended) in light of the father's

out-of-state status.

But the out-of-state status was not

the sole basis for the courts1 rulings.
the factors in a larger situation.

It was only one of

In Ellis, in addition to

be an California resident, the father also had no idea where
the mother had gone and no idea that the mother would place
the child up for adoption.

She gave birth to the child in

Utah and placed it for adoption four days later.

Shortly

thereafter, the father learned of the birth and the actions
of the child's mother.

Less than two weeks later, after the

Christmas and New Year holidays, the father filed with the
Utah Bureau a notice of his claim.
The defendant in the instant case knew when and where
and thfough what agency the adoption would take place.

The

defendant could have literally walked to Utah to file his
claim with the Bureau and secure his rights.

It is not

unconstitutional to terminate an out-of-state parent's
rights when he had adequate notice and only choose to assert
those rights after the adoption has taken place.
In In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, the father did not even
know the mother was going to place the child up for
adoption.

In addition, the baby was born early in Utah

(while the father was traveling from California to Arizona)
without the biological fatherfs knowledge.

The father did

not learn of the birth until three (3) days after the child
was born and one day after the adoption proceeding.

The

father did not know of his need to protect his rights, nor
did he know when and where he needed to protect them.
Defendant herein knew or should have known of the need to
protect his rights and he knew when and where he needed to
protect them.
Since it was possible for the defendant to comply with
the statutory requirement, and defendant did not comply only
through his own fault, the statute does not
unconstitutitionally apply to defendant.
Defendant alleges that because he did not know of the
Utah statutory requirement, he did not have a "reasonable
opportunityM to comply with it.

However, since the

defendant does not qualify under the impossibility exception
to the statute, defendant may not show "he was not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute.ff
at 208.

Wells

In addition, the defendant has never come forward

to comply with the Utah statute.

See Swayne at 940.

Assuming, arguendo, the impossibility exception does
apply, defendant was provided "reasonably opportunity11 to
comply with the statute.
Defendant knew or should of known of the requirement of
filing with the Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics.

The court

will imply or assume knowledge of the statutory requirement
when the facts of the case dictate.

Sanchez at 755; In Re

the Adoption of Baby Doe at 691; Ellis at L256.

Given

defendant's knowledge of when and where the adoption would
take place and the adoption agency involved, his age (28
years), his access to legal counsel, (he had counsel in a
pending bankruptcy proceeding, who filed the initial action
to contest the adoption in Nevada), his reasonable
intelligence and ability to operate a business, the court
must assume knowledge on the defendant's part.

One cannot

believe that defendant could have thought he protected his
rights by filing a claim of paternity in Nevada after the
adoption had taken place in Utah, and after he had been told
that Utah law would apply.

The burden in all reported cases

is on the asserting parent to find out about filing or
registration requirement.

The defendant could have found

out about the requirement through a simple phone call to the
appropriate Utah authorities.

Wells at 202.

Defendant had been specifically told the adoption would
take place in Utah and that Utah law would apply.

Defen-

dant's argument is, in effect, that he should have received
special notice of Utah law and the need for him to register
paternity in Utah.
207.

This was expressly rejected in Wells at

The Utah Supreme Court, citing Lehr v. Robertson,

rejected this argument and quoting from Lehr states:
This argument amounts to nothing more than an indirect
attack on the notice provisions of the . . . statute.
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the
adoption of young children and having the adoption
proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the

entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge*s
determination to require all interested parties to
acihere precisely to the procedural requirements oT the
statute " ". ". Since the New York statutes adequately
protected appellant's inchoate interest in establishing
a relationship with Jessica, we find no merit in the
claim that his constitutional rights were offended
Fecause the family court strictly complied with the
provisions of the statute.
Wells at 208 (citing Lehr at 265) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Utah trial court did not deny defendant his
constitutional rights.
The statute has been constitutionally applied to the
defendant.

The impossibility exception does not apply.

By

mail, car, plane or foot, defendant could have registered
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics.
notice of the State statute.

The defendant also had

Defendant, knowing that the

adoption was going to take place in Utah,

had access to

legal counsel, access to plaintiff, access to the mother,
access to any Utah governmental agency, he could have
complied with the statute.

Defendant should not be able to

exchange his "out-of-state11 status for his failure to assert
his parental rights.

It is mere fortuity that defendant

shares the same out-of-state status as the fathers in Ellis
and Baby Boy Doe.

Fortuity should not be the foundation for

a due process violation.
Therefore, the Utah requirement does not unconstitutionally burden defendant's rights and the trial court did
not deny him due process in terminating those rights.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE INTERSTATE COMPACT

ON PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN DID NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE.
The court correctly found the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children had no application in this case.

The

plaintiff was not a "sending agency" as defined in the
Interstate Compact, Article III, § 62A-4-301 (Utah Code
Annotated (1988 Supp.).

The mother herself brought the baby

into Utah (she had planned to give birth to the child in
Utah and only premature delivery prevented her) and placed
it with the adoption agency and signed her consent and
release before a notary in the state of Utah.

The mother

had initially contacted the adoption agency in the state of
Utah while living with her sister concerning the adoption of
the baby.

This does not show the plaintiff agency as one

who "shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into
any other party state . . . as a preliminary to a possible
adoption . . .."

Id.

Although the plaintiff agency provided the plane ticket
for the mother to fly to Utah, this was not the cause of her
placing the child for adoption in Utah.
own decision.

It was the mother's

The plane ticket only served to facilitate

her travel to Utah.

The motherfs intention was to travel

from California to Utah for the purpose of delivering the
baby and placing it up for adoption with plaintiff.

The

airline ticket was only to assist the mother in carrying out
her plans.

To accept defendant's contention, that the

airline ticket: caused the mother to give the child up for
adoption in Utah, is to construe her intent to give up the
child solely because of the plane ticket.
not the case.

This is simply

The mother had decided to place the child for

adoption long before a plane ticket was purchased.
The plaintiff's agent had consulted with the Utah
agency and officer that administers the Interstate Compact
and was advised that it would not apply in this case.

(Tr.

2 of 3, pp. 251 - 252). If there was any attempt to hide
this adoption from the Nevada authorities, the plaintiff
would not have requested that the Nevada Welfare Department
assist in securing defendant's signature on his second
release.

(Tr. 2 of 3, p. 130, p. 262). Finally, if Nevada

had any question about the applicability of the Interstate
Compact, they could have raise it when the Nevada Welfare
Department and Margauerite Williams were asked to assist.
(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 130 et seq)

There was no question raised

by the Nevada authorities.
Even if the plane ticket was the cause of the mother
placing the child for adoption in Utah, the mother was not
"sent" or "brought into any other party state" but arrived
in the sending agency state.

Therefore, the section does

not apply.
OA

If the court does find that the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children does apply, it would not make any
difference in this case.

Failure to comply with that

Compact would not prevent or invalidate the adoption.

Utah

Code Ann. § 62A-4-301, Art. IV, (1953 as amended).
Defendant would not necessarily have been put on notice (as
if this would have mattered), since he did not attempt to
comply with the Nevada requirement until after the adoption
had taken place.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-301 (1953 as

amended) Moreover, since the Compact specifically calls for
the application of Utah law to the adoption, Utah Code
Annotated § 62A-4-301 (1953 as amended), the defendant would
be "out of luck" because he did not comply with Utah law.
The only benefits (Appellant's Brief, p. 36) that the
defendant claims he might have received had the plaintiff
been required to and had followed the Interstate Compact is
that it might have meant a little more time for him to have
asserted his claim of paternity, and the plaintiff and
D.R.F. would not have been able to avoid dealing with him.
Neither of those claimed "benefits" in any way changes the
outcome of this case.

QS

PART TWO

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD COURT COSTS TO
THE PREVAILING PLAINTIFF
The trial court erred in not taxing costs against the
defendant.

Except as otherwise provided in statute or

rules, Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires costs to the prevailing party "unless the court
otherwise directs."

The trial court's ruling on whether to

award costs will not be disturbed unless it is shown to be
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.
First Security Bank v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah
1974) . The trial court abused its discretion in not taxing
costs.

The trial courtfs decision was also arbitrary in not

providing any reasons or support for its denial of costs.

V. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
TAXING COSTS.
Plaintiff has incurred costs in the amount of one
thousand one hundred fifty-five and three-quarters dollars
($1,155.75).

This sum includes the seventy-five dollars

($75) incurred for the filing fee, and the one thousand
eighty and three-quarters dollars ($1,080.75) incurred for
two depositions:

(1) for the defendant in two sessions, and

(2) "D.R.F," the mother of the child.
reasonable and necessarily incurred.

These costs were

A,

Filing Fee.

The cost of filing the action is a legitimate cost that
may be taxed against the defendant.

Although the court in

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), generally
limits cost awards to those provided in statute or rule, the
court will allow additional costs not provided in statute in
the reasonable discretion of the trial court.
773-774.

Id., at

Courts traditionally have taxed costs for depo-

sitions (See infra part B) and filing fees (Evans v.
Tennessee Department of Corrections, 514 F.2d 283, 284 (6th
Cir. 1975)(where federal rule 54(d), the same as Utah's,
includes filing fees as costs); Dunton v. Kibler, 518
F.Supp. 1146, 1156 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
In defining "costs" under Rule 54(d), the Frampton
court states:

,f

the generally accepted rule is that it

["costs"] means those fees which are required to be paid to
the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment."
(emphasis added).

Id. at 774

A filing fee is required to be paid to

the court upon filing a lawsuit.

It is therefore an appro-

priate cost to be taxed against the defendant upon plaintiff
prevailing in the lawsuit.
The court, in not taxing costs, abused its discretion.
Such a reasonable and necessary cost could not be denied
without an abuse of discretion.

B. Depositions.
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing
plaintiff's costs of the depositions to be taxed against the
defendant.

In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court, per Chief

Justice Crocket, states:
[A] majority of this Court has approved the taxing
as costs the taking of depositions, but subject to
the limitation that the trial court is persuaded
that they were taken in good faith and, in light
of the circumstances, appears to be essential for
the development and presentation of the case.
Id. at 774.
The trial court never indicated if plaintiff lacked either.
The trial court must be persuaded that the costs of the
depositions were reasonable and necessary.

Highland Const.

Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).
A court does not err in not awarding costs when the deposition is not used at trial and plaintiff presents no evidence
that the costs were necessarily incurred for the preparation
of the case.
1978).

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah

Plaintiff herein did use the depositions at trial.

Also, plaintiff provided evidence that these expenses were
necessary.

The evidence that the costs of the depositions

were necessarily incurred is manifest.
In Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heat., Inc.,
493 P.2d 607 (Utah 1972) the trial court impliedly found the
deposition of defendants were costs that were reasonably

necessary to protect plaintiff's rights.

These depositions

were used to aid in a "theory11 in the case that was disputed
and of great significance.
In the instant case, the deposition of defendant and of
the biological mother were reasonable and necessary for
plaintiff's case.

This case was on the "fast track11 and was

granted a priority trial setting because of the nature of
the dispute.

Defendant's story had been subject to change

and plaintiff's counsel wanted to establish defendant's
testimony under oath so as to reduce the risk of defendant
changing his story at trial and also to impeach him.

This

was the same motivation for taking "D.R.F's" deposition.
Plaintiff's counsel used defendant's deposition at
least (28) twenty-eight times at trial.

Counsel used the

deposition to refresh defendant's memory (Tr. part II, line
22, p. 166) and to impeach his testimony on hotly contested
issues of fact that went to the heart of the controversy
(Tr. part II, line 20, p. 183). Plaintiff's counsel also
used the deposition of "D.R.F" to refresh her memory and
impeach her testimony at trial (Tr. part I, line 15, p. 85).
Counsel used the depositions at least twelve (12) times
during trial on issues of great importance.

Such frequent

use of the depositions at trial is prima facie evidence of
their necessity.

In denying costs, the trial court made no

finding with regard to the need or lack of need for the
depositions.
When a deposition is used at trial on cross examination, both to impeach and refresh memory, and introduced into evidence, such use is reasonable and necessary.

Highland Const. 683 P.2d at 1051; Frampton, 605 P.2d

at 774 (costs of depositions are properly taxed "which
relate to the examination of witnesses whose testimony is
deemed essential to the trial, and taken for potential use
at testimony in the trial11) ; 20 Am. Jur.2d § 58 (1969).

The

depositions were not used solely as an aid in discovery,
plaintiff wanted to "pin11 the defendant down.

In addition,

plaintiff could not reasonably obtain this information
through any other means.

See Highland Const. 683 P.2d at

1051-1052 (where plaintiff could not reasonably obtain
information from other sources, needed to

fl

pinM the witness-

es down to a specific theory, and use of deposition at trial
all amounted to a reasonable and necessary cost incurred).
Interrogatories or requests for admission could not be used
in this case.

These discovery methods were not available

and could not be used effectively because of the expedited
trial setting in this case.

The court abused its discretion

in not awarding these costs.
Courts that have denied deposition costs have looked at
whether the deposition was actually used at trial.

Lloyd* s

Unlimited v. Nature1s Way, 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1988).
Courts have also denied costs for items such as subpoenas,
Lloyd's Unlimited, 753 P.2d at 512; expert witness' fees in
excess of statutory mandate, Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-774,
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988); Hatanaka
v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1987).

The Utah Supreme

Court denied the costs of taking depositions of party
opponents in John Price Associates, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d
713 (Utah 1978).

Although the facts of John Price are

unclear, the depositions of defendants were not very important to the case so that "reasonable minds could differ11 as
to their necessity and use.
herein of the defendant and

In contrast, the depositions
ff

D.R.F.M were very important and

essential and "reasonable minds" could not differ as to
their necessity and use.

The appellate court, therefore,

should overturn the trial court's decision denying costs to
plaintiff.
The court in Frampton draws a distinction between
legitimate costs that may be taxed as costs and expenses of
litigation that may be ever so necessary but are not properly taxable as costs.

Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. This

distinction refers to an expense that a statute allows to be
taxed as costs, but is in excess of the statutory limit.
Id.

In Frampton, the court analyzed expert witness, subpoe-

na fees, and depositions.

The standard used for depositions
Li

Id..

is "reasonably and necessary."

costs were reasonable and necessary.

As shown above, these
Since the court has

previously allowed the taxing of costs for depositions and
expressly provides for cost of the court, what plaintiff
asks for are legitimate taxable costs.

Because the trial

court denied to tax costs here, its decision was an abuse of
discretion.

When

ff

[n]o question was made as to the good

faith of . . . [plaintiff] incurring these costs and they
appear to be reasonable.
matter of course."

They should have been allowed as a

Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of

Ogden, 364 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1961).

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DENIED COSTS.
Even if the trial court did deny plaintiff's costs for

an appropriate reason, the court should have articulated its
reason for doing so.
A court's exercise of discretion is arbitrary if the
court does not supply any reasons for its decision.

If the

court denies the taxing of costs, it must supply some basis
or reasoning for such denial.
In addition, the case law provides that no decision of
the trial court will be disturbed unless it is arbitrary or
an abuse of discretion.

See supra.

This mandate implies

that the trial court must supply some basis for its ruling.
It is impossible to determine if a decision is arbitrary if
AO

no reasons are given for the decision and as herein the
court denies costs completely.

The majority of cases in

this area reported on appeal deal with taxing of costs that
are too high.

The trial court does not need to articulate

any reasons in those cases because it has taxed the costs.
An explanation is only needed from the party complaining
that such costs are too high.
Two cases that treat the complete denial of costs,
Nelson and Lloyd1s, each find that plaintiff has not met the
burden of proving the costs were reasonable and necessary.
The instant case differs substantially from Nelson and
Lloyd's as the factors of reasonableness and necessity are
manifest.

Given that plaintiff met its burden, the

responsibility would shift, then, to the trial court to
articulate reasons why these costs should be denied.

Denial

of costs without out any explanation must be presumed arbitrary.

Because the court declined to tax as costs the
reasonable and necessary expenses of depositions and filing
fee to a prevailing party, the trial court abused its
discretion.

In addition, because the trial court failed to

articulate any reason for the denial of costs, the trial
court's decision was arbitrary.
taxed the costs.

The defendant should be

CONCLUSION

The decision of the trial court as to the termination
of the defendant's parental rights should be affirmed and
the adoption of the child should be allowed to proceed.
The decision of the trial court refusing to award the
plaintiff, as the prevailing party, its court courts should
be reversed and the matter remanded with an order to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for said costs.
DATED this 24th day of August, 1989.
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